Remittances: A Complement to International Aid

By Rohit Sudarshan

The future of traditional foreign assistance is in a precarious situation. Over the past five years, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries that contribute the largest share of international aid—namely Australia, France, and the U.S.—have seen a downward trend in official development assistance (ODA) as a percentage of gross national income (GNI). Additionally, the United Kingdom’s development agency, DFID, is currently handling a surge of fraud investigations regarding their foreign aid. Countries that are global leaders must promote other financial means for international development. Few options are as important and efficient as remittances.

Remittances are payments made by immigrants to families and friends in their country of origin and represent an effective method for those in developing countries to continue to improve their standard of living. While ODA requires the coordination of government agencies as well as policymakers from many countries, remittances do not face that same constraint. The difficulty in ensuring accountability has meant that governments have misused and absorbed aid money. For these reasons, remittances can be an appealing alternative; they can move expediently and directly to a recipient that needs it.

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Hawala: An International Development Tool?

By Catarina Santos

Introduction

Roughly 38 percent of the two billion people in the world’s lowest economic percentile do not have bank accounts and therefore lack access to the global financial market.  Hawala, or “transfer” in Arabic, is a remittance system that runs parallel to formal financial system transactions. Although it is often associated with financing terrorist activities, narcotics trafficking and tax evasion, and is therefore illegal in most countries, hawala can be an important tool to facilitate the sending of remittances. This is especially the case for poorer populations in developing countries and for transactions by undocumented people. In fact, remittances received through hawala account for a third of Somalia’s gross domestic product (GDP).

Despite its ubiquity in many parts of the world, hawala remains under the radar. This article provides a background on how hawala functions, discusses why it can be an attractive alternative remittance system, and considers whether hawala should be regulated as a security threat or promoted as a development tool.

Background on hawala and how it works

Hawala started in South Asia around the 18th century, before Western banking practices reached the region. It evolved over the years and today is used mostly by migrant workers overseas for financial transactions domestically and internationally. This system distinguishes itself from the traditional remittance systems because it is largely based on trust and uses family connections and affiliations within communities to circulate money between “hawaladars,” or hawala dealers.

Why would migrants prefer to use this system over an official banking system? The main reasons are cost effectiveness, efficiency, reliability, lack of bureaucracy, and tax evasion. This system does not require identification documents or formal bank accounts, and does not leave a paper trail.  Users of this method are therefore often associated with undocumented people and people committing illegal activities.

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Creating Public-Private-Military Partnerships to Fill Administrative and Financial Gaps in U.S. Infrastructure Reconstruction Projects in Afghanistan

By Jackson Celestin 

On March 11, 2016, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) John F. Sopko released a report reviewing 45 Department of Defense (DOD) reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Of the 45 projects, 28 did not meet structural contract requirements or technical specifications, 16 were structurally deficient to the point that they were considered unsafe for use, and 7 of the 15 completed projects had never been used. According to Sopko, the projects suffered from inadequate contractors, project management and oversight; and faulty building materials. To limit deficient projects, Sopko suggested the DOD improve its project planning and design procedures, hire contractors who are qualified and capable of complying with construction requirements, and conduct adequate oversight to guarantee that projects are built to protocol and contractors are held accountable

 Though Sopko’s recommendations are reasonable solutions, they ignore larger trends visible in the U.S.’ reconstruction budget in Afghanistan. Of the $114.92 billion the U.S. has spent since 2002 through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund, the DOD has dedicated $10.68 billion (9 percent) to Operations and Oversight and only $990 million (less than 1 percent) to the main infrastructure fund, the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF).

Between Sopko’s report and the allocation of U.S. reconstruction funds in Afghanistan, there appears to be an expertise, administration, and funding gap that is preventing the United States from establishing sustainable infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. In the field of international development, this is a common challenge, and more agencies are turning to public-private partnerships (PPPs) to address it. Inspired by PPPs in international development, this blog presents a new model that partners the public and private sectors with the military. This article will refer to this model as Public-Private-Military Partnerships (PPMPs). Though they may face challenges in attracting private investors, working with low starting budgets, and addressing anti-Western and anti-military perceptions, PPMPs can combine the groups’ comparative advantages to fill the knowledge and funding gap in the United States’ Afghanistan reconstruction projects. They can also further connect the military to global development for better military assistance in conflict areas and help conflict and post-conflict areas to pursue global development and sustainability goals.

jackson-blog

This graph is an original creation of the author, Jackson Celestin, based on data from the July 30, 2016 SIGAR Quarterly Report to Congress.

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Buy Social: A New Way for International Organizations to Create Social Impact

By Waka Itagaki

Introduction

International organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank have significant purchasing power. In 2014, the UN purchased $17.2 billion in their procurement process. Despite this purchasing power, international organizations have arguably not made the most of it to generate social impact across the world. “Buy Social,” a procurement process that seeks not only economic value but also social and/or environmental impact, has the potential to be transformative. This article highlights the benefits and challenges of Buy Social compared to “Socially Responsible Procurement,” and recommends that international organizations implement Buy Social.

Background

There is no widely agreed term to describe this kind of socially conscious procurement. This article uses “Buy Social” but other names include “Social Procurement,” “Socially Impactful Procurement,” “Social Impact Purchasing,” “Social Purchasing,” and “Socially Impactful Purchasing.” It is important to note that Buy Social is different from Socially Responsible Procurement, which is already implemented by international organizations.

Socially Responsible Procurement applies negative or positive screens to bidders by using a “do no harm” approach. For example, the UN buys from companies that meet labor standards of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Socially responsible procurement typically only considers if a bidder is a business with social consideration, and does not measure the outcomes.

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Reducing Transaction Costs in Development Impact Bonds

By Waka Itagaki

Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) are a results-based financing mechanism that leverages private capital for international development. Since the first DIBs were created in 2014, one of the mechanism’s key challenges has been high transaction costs: Each DIB project is unique, and this customization increases legal fees and requires financial intermediary and technical services. This article highlights two ways to reduce these costs: sharing data and knowledge about DIBs among stakeholders, and limiting the focus of DIBs. The reduction of transaction costs will promote greater use of DIBs for international development.

Introduction and Background

DIBs catalyze private investment that generates social impact as well as financial return, so called “impact investment,” by engaging private investors, service providers, host-country governments, donors, and intermediaries. Once all stakeholders agree on a common goal and an evaluation method, private investors provide upfront funding for a development project and work with service providers. If and only if the pre-agreed development outcomes are achieved, host-country governments or donors repay the investors. An intermediary organization coordinates among the stakeholders and contributes to the creation of a deal that meets all stakeholders’ interests.

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