Emerging from the Darkness: Albania’s Informal Economy

Bruna Blog ImagePhoto of New Bazaar in Tirana, Albania by Flickr user Tokil under an Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic license.

By Brunilda Kosta

Last year, Albania took the third step in the government’s plan to reduce economic informality, an issue which has long restricted development and prosperity for the country. For this article, the informal economy is defined as activities which are legal but do not fully comply with state regulations. They include tax evasion, lack of business registration, and labor regulation avoidance. Such forms of informal economic activity are detrimental to a country’s economic growth, and seem to occur more frequently in countries that are undergoing structural reforms and transitional economic adjustments, such as Albania.

Numerous studies have showcased the high level of informality in Albania. Friedrich Schneider, Professor of Economics at the Johannes Kepler University (2010), estimated that in 2007 the Albanian informal economy was equivalent to 32.9 percent of GDP. A 2013 study conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) surveyed business leaders in Albania,  40 percent of whom admitted that they are forced to compete with the informal sector. Finally, in 2015 the Albanian government disclosed that the informal economy makes up 50 percent of GDP. These startling figures encouraged the government to institute reforms. In 2015, the Albanian government elevated its focus on informality and undertook diverse actions to mitigate the associated issues. This article analyzes the Albanian government’s approach to reducing informality and aims to come up with actionable and pragmatic policy recommendations for implementing effective reforms.

The Albanian government has struggled to integrate the informal sector into the economy for many years. The informal economy moved into the spotlight in August 2015 when Albania’s Prime Minister publicly announced that the government would make it a priority, but failed to provide a timeline or specific details on how to do so. Following this announcement, Albania’s Minister of Finance vaguely explained their ideas for addressing informality but did not lay out a public strategy. In April 2016, the Minister of Finance announced the next action, a strategy designed in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF); however, the strategy remained vague. The business community and economic experts argued that these actions were taken haphazardly and with the purpose of increasing government revenues. The third phase was launched in September 2017 and went into effect at the beginning of October the same year. The government announced that it will spare no efforts to “eradicate” informality. These recurrent actions produced encouraging outcomes such as additional revenues and an increased number of registered businesses and employees. Simultaneously, these actions have had economic and psychological consequences for business operations.

One of the key actors in the informal sector is employees. In Albania, informal employment is manifested in various patterns as displayed in the chart below: 39.75 percent of employees declared not to have a written contract with their employer, while 30.29 percent of employees declared that they do not pay for social and health security benefits (Figure 1). When compared to the averages for Southeastern Europe (SEE), the biggest difference was between the number of employees with no written contract. One reason behind this high level of informal employment could be the short-term benefits to employees such as earning extra income that would otherwise have been taxed. Nevertheless, aside from some rudimentary benefits, the drawbacks of staying informal outweigh the informal benefits. For example, operating in the informal economy prevents employees from reaping the benefits of the formal sector like earning a pension and having a higher salary. A recent study estimates that Albanian workers earn 29.3 percent more in the formal sector than in the informal, despite widespread belief of the opposite.

Figure 1: Informal employment patterns

Bruna Blog Chart

Source: Albanian Center for Economic Research (ACER) & Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI), 2016

Another pattern of informality is underreporting income. This often occurs among firms that utilize only cash transactions, which is a widespread practice in Albania. A study of the National Business Forum in Albania found that businesses underreport around 30 percent of annual turnover.

Many of these statistics support, to some extent, the government’s efforts to address informality in the last several years. The Albanian government’s intentions were positive, but its approach to combating informality has been flawed. The purpose is to incentivize informal firms to transition into the formal market; however, coercing firms out of the shadows carries significant risks. In Albania, formalized firms struggle to survive because regulations are burdensome, which is a contributing factor to informality. Some challenges for Albanian business owners, according to the recently released Global Competitiveness Index include tax rates, corruption, and access to financing. This report is corroborated by the most recent Doing Business report 2018 for Albania, which shows that ‘paying taxes’ is a major obstacle to the ability for businesses to grow and succeed. The Albanian government should decrease the regulations placed on businesses, which could naturally facilitate the formalization process.

Fortunately, sustainable change is starting to occur. For example, it is worth applauding the government’s recent withdraw from its initial plan to include small businesses in the value-added tax scheme. This shows that the government’s genuine efforts to diminish the informal economy, coupled with effective dialogue with the business community, could yield positive results and generate a win-win scenario. Moreover, the government has stimulated notable positive results despite its lack of transparency and collaboration with the business community. For example, in 2016, Albania had an average of 56 registered firms per 1,000 people, while in 2014 it had 40 registered firms per 1,000 people. This shows that there was an increase in the number of businesses registered over the span of two years. On the other hand, more than 100,000 businesses deactivated their status or initiated their forms for closing procedure. The tough actions of putting people in jail raised psychological pressure and fear among businesses which disrupted normal business operations.

The fundamental question remains: how can the government encourage informal businesses to move into the formal sector, while minimizing the negative consequences of doing so? The following policy recommendations should be considered:

  1. The government should stop prematurely talking about actions without the knowledge base to support those actions. Working in the hidden economy in SEE is often socially embedded and not simply a matter of rational choice to maximize personal benefit. Hence, a comprehensive understanding of social norms, cultural customs, and historical facts should be understood first.
  2. The government should include interrelated issues that incentivize formalization. For instance, small businesses often fear that coming out of the shadows will mean more shakedowns by corrupt officials or entanglement in bureaucratic red tape. Corruption is a clear concern and burden for the business community and should be addressed by the government.
  3. Using structural reforms and technology to curb informality could also benefit government finances, growth, and poverty reduction.
  4. Tackling informality should be a joint effort strategy; the government should improve their dialogue with the business community and effectively engage with and accept their reasonable proposals.
  5. Finally, the government should design a clear strategy for informal economy mitigation, drawn on sectoral basis, and associated with a rational action plan.

It is difficult for any economy to eradicate informality entirely. However, bringing informal activity out of the shadow economy has the potential to boost tax revenues, increase productivity, spur economic growth, and improve the quality of life for Albania’s citizens.

Impact Investors Are Changing: Analysis from the GIIN Surveys

By Waka Itagaki

This article is the second in a series from this author on the topic of impact investing. For Waka Itagaki’s earlier post on reducing transaction costs in development impact bonds, please click here.

 

Introduction and Background

The role that impact investors are playing in international development is increasingly growing. The amount of assets under management (AUM), the total market value of investments managed by financial institutions, in emerging countries was $36.4 billion in 2015. This is larger than the net Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by the United States. International development actors should pay attention to this shift and become acquainted with the work of impact investors. One way to do this is through reading the annual impact investor surveys conducted by the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN).

GIIN is a nonprofit organization that supports activities, education, and research that accelerate the development of a coherent impact investing industry. GIIN has conducted annual impact investor surveys since 2009 by leveraging its network of impact investors, and the surveys provide information on the current situation of impact investors. However, these surveys fail to acknowledge how impact investors are changing over time. Moreover, there is not much literature by other stakeholders that analyzes the data and discusses trends in impact investing in a consumable way. This article fills this gap by analyzing six GIIN surveys from 2009 to 2015 to illustrate how impact investors are changing.

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Emerging Development Donor Profile: South Korea

By Samantha Prior

South Korea is often viewed as a developmental success story; over the last fifty years it has been successfully transitioning from aid recipient to aid donor. In 2010 South Korea became a member of OECD, marking a significant step in its efforts towards becoming a major aid donor. Here are some notable statistics that give a sense of Korea’s evolution from recipient to donor:

Overall growth is stunning:  In the post-war period South Korea was one of the world’s poorest countries with a per capita income of $64, and received large amounts of aid, specifically from the U.S. (12.7 billion between 1945 and the late 1990s, according to the Korean government), to repair its broken economy. The South Korean economy has steadily improved over the last 50+ years (it is currently the world’s 12th largest economy), which enabled it to start giving aid in the end of the 20th century. The Korea Eximbank’s Economic Development and Co-operation Fund (EDCF) was created in 1987, followed by the Korea International Co-operation Agency (KOICA) in 1991.

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Landlocked Developing Countries Face Unique Challenges on Trade and Economic Progress

By Milos Purkovic

On November 5, the United Nations concluded its second conference on landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and produced a 10-year action plan designed to address their bottlenecks related to transit, trade, and infrastructure. According to the 2014 Human Development Report, nine of the poorest performing 15 countries are landlocked and face additional burdens in these areas critical for economic growth. Further, the UN conference highlights growing international recognition of “landlockedness” as a development issue and an opportunity for broad based economic growth. Below are key takeaways from the conference, and implications for development in LLDCs.

1.     Trade processes in LLDCs are more expensive, take more time, and have more steps than in average transit countries

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In 2013, the cost for LLDCs to export and import a standard 20 foot container was over twice the average cost of shipping in transit countries. Additionally, export costs from 2006-2013 grew at a faster rate in LLDCs than in transit developing countries — roughly 38 percent compared to 26 percent. Import costs over the same period increased about 35 percent in LLDCs versus 22 percent in transit countries.

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Russian Sanctions, Tajik Remittances, and Chinese Investment

By Michael Jacobs

While the situation in Ukraine and its effect on the Russian and European economies have been the subject of countless news stories and op-eds for several months, the implications for the former soviet countries in Central Asia have largely been ignored. One of these countries in particular, Tajikistan, may face the most severe and direct consequences of a Russian economic slow-down.  This outcome looks increasingly likely as falling oil prices amplify the negative impact of economic sanctions in energy-dependent Russia.

Tajikistan, however much it may depend on the Russian economy now, isn’t waiting around to find out what would happen if the Russian economy falters. Tajikistan recently accepted an offer of $6 billion in new investments from China over the next 3 years, which is part of a larger Chinese push into Central Asia. China may use this investment to build oil refineries and has already built numerous cement factories in Tajikistan in recent years as Chinese workers have contributed to a construction boom in Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe. These cement factories have also led to some speculation that in the future China may look to fund the completion of the controversial Rogun Dam, which began construction in 1976 and saw work suspended in 2012. The graphs below illustrate Tajikistan’s dependence on Russia as well as the magnitude of China’s recent investments. As a note, comparisons with China’s investment assume $2 billion are invested each year ($6 billion total investment divided evenly over 3 years).

1.  Tajikistan is the Most Remittance-Dependent Country in the World

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