Michael Levett, RIP

Michael Levett

By Daniel Runde

My friend and CSIS colleague, Michael Levett, died in his mid-70s over the weekend. A wonderful man who lived a truly interesting life, I feel cheated out of at least 15 years of friendship, and counsel.

Michael, a Californian, grew up in Los Angeles, went to UCLA and was editor of the newspaper there. He worked for the LA Times out of college for several years. He was active in Democratic politics in the late 60s and the 1970s. He volunteered or was paid staff on a number of Democratic and civil rights campaigns in California. Later, he worked for Lucas Films where he was a Vice President, contributing to the first three Stars Wars films (Episodes 4, 5, 6, of course) and the first Indiana Jones film. He knew George Lucas and all of the film stars and had wonderful stories about working with them. He helped developed the toys and commercial products that are associated with those films. Those toys were important totems of my childhood and of the childhoods of millions of other Generation Xers. I was fascinated about his pilgrimages to Bentonville, Arkansas to sell Wal-Mart on the idea of placing Stars Wars toys in each Wal-Mart. He also worked for a brief time for Dino DeLaurentiis, working on Dune and, I believe, Conan the Barbarian. Given his background, he was kind enough to see Once Upon a Time in Hollywood with me last September, a real treat.

Michael launched his career in Washington, D.C. a White House fellow in one of the inaugural classes. He was quite young when picked for this great honor. He worked in the Department of the Interior during the Nixon Administration. Always very liberal and idealistic, he loved being a White House fellow but perhaps the Nixon Administration was not the best “fit” for him. He stayed in close contact with his White House fellow alums and made lifelong friends.

At some point along the way, someone convinced him to move to Russia in the late 1980s. He believed that we needed to have dialogue with the Soviet Union and he voted with his feet. He organized rock music concerts and started a popcorn business in the Soviet Union becoming the “Orville Redenbacher of the Soviet Union.”

His experiences in Russia and his ties to Washington generated a phone call asking him to help run the Citizens Democracy Corps (“CDC”) in the mid-1990s. CDC was stood up as part of the Bush 41 Administration’s response to the end of the Cold War. It appointed a star board of American captains of industry and was funded largely by USAID at the beginning. CDC changed its name several times over the years and is now known as Pyxera Global. The original idea of CDC was: 1) private sector partnerships before these were common, 2) leverage the talents of volunteers at scale before this was “a thing” and 3) go where they were needed often to places that others would not go to. In the early and mid-1990s this meant the former Soviet Union and Poland including Central Asia, later this meant Iraq, Afghanistan and Africa. Michael spent at least 8 years travelling around the former Soviet Union, building partnerships with multinational companies, acquiring other NGOs, and diversifying CDC’s funding away from US Government funding. CDC, under Michael, were early adapters to leveraging the power of global supply chains for good, creating large scale volunteer programs tied to business activities for companies such as IBM, and creating new programming around the role of travel, tourism and hospitality as a driver of jobs and prosperity. Michael led CDC and its successor organizations for 15 years. Today Pyxera gets less than 20% of its money from the federal government and most from corporate sources.

In the early 1990s, he was the founding president of Business for Social Responsibility (BSR). Michael played a key role in mainstreaming “stakeholder” concerns including concepts such as “social license to operate” and “corporate social responsibility” when these ideas were very new and only had a toehold in the most progressive companies. Entire industries have sprung up because of the work of BSR championed and Michael pioneered. The recent statements by large investors and large business groups can be connected in a straight line from his work in the early 1990s.

At CSIS, Michael was a Senior Associate with the Project on Prosperity and Development for the last ten years. I saw or spoke with him at least every two weeks during that time. Given his experience and travel history, he was a constant resource for events and publications on a variety of international development topics. He brought a lot of ideas to the report we did in 2011 on development finance, titled Sharing Risk in a World of Danger and Opportunity. He also helped with a major report, Seizing the Opportunity in Public-Private Partnerships, that same year. In 2013, he was an advisor to a commission we did on the role of the private sector in development. At his instigation, we did a report on the travel, tourism and hospitality sector, Global Travel, Tourism, and Hospitality as a Strategic Sector for Development and Security. He served as an advisor to our task force on reforming and reorganizing U.S. foreign assistance in 2017, and he was a major part of our task force on confronting the global forced migration crisis in 2018, leading fact-finding missions to multiple countries. I have fond memories travelling with him to New York and Los Angeles various times. He traveled with some of my colleagues to Africa and elsewhere. His report on value chains, Maximizing Development of Local Content across Industry Sectors in Emerging Markets, is still read and is recognized as one of the few papers on this relevant and pressing topic. Offering his time and his talents to CSIS, Michael would provide comedic relief and adventure to everything he did. He took time to shepherd and share his experiences with young professionals at CSIS and throughout DC. He had strong, well-formed views and was wonderful to be around. He had a broad sense of the spiritual and the strong sense of what he thought was right or wrong and acted accordingly. Never far from a joke, Michael was a Mensch, and I am really going to miss him.

Shutting Down Digital Authoritarianism

Author: Rachel Abrams, Research Intern (Fall 2019), Center for Strategic and International Studies

A man darts across a busy street, taking advantage of the lack of traffic and capitalizing on the extra 30 seconds to justify a coffee before work. Minutes later, his panicked expression flashes on a billboard across the street, branding him as a jaywalker. His heart drops, and so does his social credit score. Although it sounds eerily familiar to the plot of a Black Mirror episode, this is actually a very real scenario in Rongcheng, China, where the city has implemented a social credit system, tracked by facial recognition, artificial intelligence, and vast quantities of personal data. This jaywalker (and others with low scores) can lose access to loans or potential promotions at work while model citizens (who donate to charity or do other good deeds that are arbitrarily determined) find themselves broadcasted at the City Hall or receive discounts on products. What is happening in Rongcheng is a real-world example of how digital authoritarianism is on the rise. This rise in authoritarianism is also being spread globally, with Chinese companies exporting their technologies to a number of governments, including Ethiopia, Ecuador, South Africa, Bolivia, Egypt, Rwanda, and Saudi Arabia. Their efforts have enabled authoritarian regimes to acquire digital tools for surveillance and control that they would not have the capability to develop on their own.

Digital authoritarianism, defined as using technology to enhance or enable authoritarian governance, has been a concern since the advent of the internet. However, as AI and other emerging technologies generate unparalleled amounts of data and new ways to harness it, authoritarian governments have managed to leverage a novel and efficient way to control their populations. Digital authoritarianism lets governments monitor, understand, and control their citizens far better than ever before, often at a reasonable cost. Most governments have access to huge amounts of data from tax returns, medical and criminal records, bank statements, location services on apps, and technologies that track biometric data and have facial recognition capabilities. Unbound by democratic principles like due process and the rule of law, authoritarian governments have no qualms about using that data for massive social control. These governments are also able to selectively censor information and public behaviors that may damage the regime while allowing for economically positive discourse and actions. China has become one of the major exporters of digital authoritarianism through state and private actors. It is important to note that many private firms around the world have exported dual-use technologies or technologies that can be used in both military and civilian spheres. However, due to the extremely close relationship between the Chinese state and its large technology companies, it is evident that Chinese firms are using these technologies in a way that aligns with state ideologies. For example, tools that inspect internet data to filter and block malware could be used to filter and censor online content, and CCTV cameras for security can be used for surveillance.

For the Chinese government, the idea of using technology to govern is not new. Once the Chinese government noticed technology was becoming a part of daily life, it realized it had a powerful new tool to both gather information and control culture, with the ultimate goal of making the Chinese people more “governable.” Several current Chinese initiatives, done by partnerships between government and Chinese tech companies, focus on harvesting data and using it to influence behavior. China’s use of digital authoritarianism to subdue and control its population while growing its economy challenges the theory that liberal democracy is the only means of achieving sustainable economic growth. In part, this is because there is a gap in understanding the proper and democratic use of new technologies that have emerged in the last generation that is getting exploited. Unless liberal democracies of the world come together and create a framework for data governance, authoritarian actors will continue to exploit this gap and build on the Chinese model to grow.

Technology is a core tenant of the Belt and Road Initiative, and China’s overall soft power strategy. The strategy has three components: first, digital power via tech-driven strength, “fore-power” via long-range planning and strategy, and third, sharp power via the regime’s ability to manipulate opinion abroad. China’s proliferation of dual-use technologies abroad illustrates how authoritarianism can spread. In Freedom House’s “Freedom of the Net” assessment, out of the 65 countries surveyed, 38 had installed Chinese telecom infrastructure (via companies like Huwaei or ZTE), 18 had installed AI surveillance infrastructure, and many countries had implemented a combination of the two. These technologies are being used both by governments to monitor their citizens, and for China to monitor governments; in January, it was reported that the IT-network in the African Union headquarters, which was built by China, had been secretly transmitting confidential data to Shanghai for five years. In many countries, including Zimbabwe, Singapore, and several Eurasian countries, Chinese companies are creating “Smart Cities” run by sophisticated surveillance systems composed of artificial intelligence and facial recognition, which allows governments to track civilian movements. Almost more importantly, representatives from 36 out of the 65 countries in the Freedom House list have had private training sessions with Chinese officials on their new technologies. In Uganda, Chinese employees helped hack into a political opponent’s personal Whatsapp so the regime could shut down his rallies before they started. Chinese actors are not only spreading technologies that could be misused but are also actively teaching governments how to use these technologies and spreading authoritarian values.

The United States needs to realize that if foreign governments start to see digital authoritarianism as a viable alternative to liberal democracy, they will feel no pressure to liberalize. The best way for democracies to stop the rise of digital authoritarianism is to prove by example that there is a better model for managing the internet that protects countries’ sovereignty and spurs economic growth. Overall, an ideal model for data governance should empower people and societies to make informed decisions about their data, protect individual privacy and civilian rights, and allow innovators, entrepreneurs, and service providers to share and use data freely as long as they abide by these protections. As the United States has historically benefited from having an open society that encourages innovation, growth, and design, instituting a data governance framework should not stifle its creators and companies.

Recommendations

While achieving a universally enforceable solution will require more time and consensus, there is a window of opportunity where the United States can leverage its commercial and economic ties with other countries to make smaller but meaningful gains in democratic data governance. This will begin with the U.S. government establishing a regulatory body and involving stakeholders outside of the traditional policy sphere, including lawyers, researchers, civil society, and advocacy groups, as well as representatives from technology companies, to ensure at-risk groups are not forgotten or discriminated against. This regulatory body should set guidelines that promote good data governance. Suggested guidelines could include:

1. Limit the Amount of Time Data is Stored and Reduce Collateral Information Collection

In the case of facial recognition technologies, the data should only be held for the time that it is needed, for example, in an ongoing police investigation, and faces captured by mistake should be blurred to protect individual privacy. Doing so will allay fears that the government is gathering data to monitor citizens, along with the added benefit of lessening the risk of these data being hacked or stolen by nefarious actors.

2. Restrict Data Sharing and Create Opt-out Policies

Similar to the idea of reducing collateral information collection, companies that share data need to be subjected to clear standards and must be able to justify why the sharing organizations need the data. Additionally, consumers must be aware that their data can be shared and either consent or opt-out of the process.

3. Ensure a Healthy Media Environment

The U.S. must learn from the 2016 presidential election and elections around the world and create standards for advertising and campaigning via social networks like those that exist in television and other media. For example, how the Federal Communications Commission requires that all political cable spots have a visual sponsorship identification.

Much of the conversation about digital authoritarianism focuses on the countries perpetuating it but also needs to focus on the companies that help enable it. A regulatory body specifically devoted to data governance could also be tasked with imposing sanctions and regulations upon these companies. Many U.S. companies have bowed to pressure to censor content on governments’ behalf in order to retain access to markets; in particular, Netflix currently complies with censorship requirements in China, India, and Saudi Arabia, and Apple, which fought the U.S. government to put backdoors in password-protected products, has deleted apps and built data centers that follow Chinese government requirements. Currently, companies like Facebook, Uber, and YouTube fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission, which is too overworked to handle the complexities that overseeing apps, and these tech giants entail. More importantly, many companies based in democracies create and export the very dual-use technologies that are being misused by authoritarian and authoritarian-leaning countries. The Trump administration took a stand against this by putting eight of the top Chinese surveillance and intelligence companies on a blacklist that forbids them to buy U.S-tech, citing the crisis in Xinjiang as their reason. This move sends a strong message in support of human rights and a stronger message to China about what they can and cannot get away with but is not a sustainable model for the future.

In its role as a world leader and champion of liberal democracy, the United States needs to set a new model for how to democratically govern data. By designating a regulatory body solely to matters of data governance and oversight, the U.S. will show the international community that there is an effective means of data use and governance that is not authoritarian in nature and provide a viable social and economic model to China. Additionally, by taking steps to regulate technology within its own borders, the United States will curb the lawlessness that is the tech industry and make long-overdue steps to creating a sustainable framework that promotes innovation and protects civilian rights.

John Sanbrailo – Rest in Peace

John Sanbrailo

This photo was taken on May 15, 2016 and features John Sanbrailo (left), Luis Almagro (OAS Secretary General-center), and Luis Ubinas (President of Board of PADF-right).

By Daniel Runde

I knew John Sanbrailo professionally and personally for more than 15 years. He had been having health struggles for the last 5 years. We’ve been on a committee together recently providing a sounding board to an author who is writing a history of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

John dedicated his life to political and economic progress in the Western Hemisphere and believed the United States and the rest of the hemisphere had a shared future. He was driven partially by a strong sense of history and was the first person to show me that the U.S. had engaged in enlightened self-interest through acts of foreign aid, even in the 18th century. He wrote a paper, published in the American Foreign Service Association, about the first “aid packages” the U.S. sent in the Western Hemisphere. As early as 1792, the U.S. was accepting thousands of refugees from Haiti during the Haitian Revolution. The U.S. supported Haiti’s independence from France and provided aid to Haiti through the establishment of a relief fund. In 1812, Congress appropriated $50,000 in support to Venezuelan victims after an earthquake which took place at the start of the Venezuelan War of Independence. The U.S. supported Venezuela at this time not only for humanitarian purposes, but to help Venezuelans regain their footing against the Spanish and prevent further European influence in the region.

John joined USAID in the 1960s at the height of the Alliance for Progress. The Alliance for Progress was started by President Kennedy in 1961 alongside USAID; it was a part of President Kennedy’s goal to improve U.S. relations with Latin America and promote democracy and economic cooperation in a time that was threatened by communist insurgents. The Alliance for Progress was not only the right thing to do, but it was also a response to the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and our fear that other countries in the region would be tempted to go the way of Cuba. An entire generation of Latin Americanists, international development professionals, and business leaders were inspired by Kennedy’s foreign policy initiative through the Alliance for Progress and John was one of them.

John was particularly quick to note that the Alliance for Progress was not a Democratic party project but had strong support from the Republican party, in particular Nelson Rockefeller who had huge interest in Latin America. Rockefeller also worked in the Office of Inter-American Affairs and was the first Assistant Secretary for Latin American affairs in the early 1940s. He went on to establish two organizations in the mid-1940s focused on economic development in Latin America. Nelson Rockefeller (former Vice President under President Gerald Ford and former Governor of New York) heavily influenced his brother, David Rockefeller. David was interested in doing business in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s. During his time at Chase National Bank, David significantly expanded the bank’s international operations. In the 1950s and 1960s, a series of organizations were established to support relations between the U.S. and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. In 1959, the Inter-American Development Bank was established. In 1963, David Rockefeller founded the Council of the Americas. Nelson influenced David who helped encourage American business interests in the Americas. John was a part of this renaissance between Latin America and the U.S.

John Sanbrailo was born in a generation that was familiar with the influential book, the Ugly American (published in 1958 with almost 4 million copies sold) which described our incompetence and cultural insensitivity while trying to engage with others in the outside world. The Ugly American had a profound impact on President Kennedy too.

John Sanbrailo loved working at USAID; he started working there in 1969 and left reluctantly in 1999. He served in a number of important places at critical times. He served as USAID Mission Director in Ecuador, Peru, Honduras, and El Salvador. In Peru, John was an early supporter of Hernando de Soto who established his think tank, the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD) in Peru with major support from USAID. It is ironic that the ILD was supported by USAID because many of my conservative Republican colleague’s dislike USAID but really like Hernando de Soto and the ILD without realizing that USAID helped stand it up and supported it for decades.

In 1999, John joined PADF which was started in 1962 as a nonprofit arm with ties to the Organization of American States (OAS). John was always quick to remind you that PADF’s original charter talked about partnerships with the private sector. During his time as Executive Director, John took PADF from less than $10 million in annual operations in 1998 to $95 million in 2017. The organization was, by all accounts, not in a great place when he started, but he recruited a new board, reformulated the mission, recruited new people, and leveraged his relationships around the hemisphere, leading PADF to become one of the premier social enterprises in the Western Hemisphere with major partners including Haiti, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. John was always very active in Colombia and the Northern Triangle. He had a special place in his heart for Ecuador, where his wife–Cecilia del Pozo–was from.

Over the course of John’s career, things changed dramatically in Latin America and he helped. The United States developed a different kind of relationship with countries in the region barring Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba. In 1970, the adjusted net national income per capita was approximately $450 in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to the Freedom House Index, 11 countries in the Western Hemisphere were labeled as “free” and 4 countries were considered “not free” in 1972. When John retired from the Pan-American Development Foundation (PADF) in 2016, the average national income per capita is $6,407 in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to the Freedom House Index, 23 countries in the Western Hemisphere were labeled as “free” and one was considered “not free” in 2016.

John’s legacy can been seen in the strengthen relationship between the U.S. and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. He also left behind a strong and relevant PADF. As we face challenges in Venezuela and the Northern Triangle and as we embrace opportunities in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, we will miss John’s sense of history and his decades of experience.

 

The United States Needs a Stronger World Bank

By Pamela Cox

The World Bank, the leading multilateral institution whose mission is to fight poverty and boost economic development, is seeking a capital increase to continue its lending operations.  The capital increase request has generated debate in Washington D.C. about the World Bank’s future role in international development. Some advocate that the World Bank continue its current role as lender to poor and middle-income countries, but with a set of reforms to reflect twenty-first century realities. Others advocate that the World Bank shift its focus to only the poorest and fragile states. Yet others want to refocus the World Bank into a new type of financing institution for global public goods. Despite the differing views, the U.S. and other shareholders should continue supporting the work of the World Bank, while the World Bank needs to adapt its role to the changing world, building on its strengths.

In its 74-year history, the World Bank has changed its model several times, to respond to shareholders’ demands and global trends. Founded originally as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to finance post war reconstruction in Europe, the World Bank made is first loan to France in 1947. But as the Marshall Plan ramped up, the World Bank quickly shifted to financing projects in lower and middle-income countries constrained by access to capital. Recognizing the importance of promoting private sector-led development in these countries, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established in 1956 to do both debt and equity lending. As former colonies became independent but lacked credit worthiness to access capital markets, the International Development Association (IDA) was created in 1960 to offer very low interest long term loans (later changed to grants) to the poorest of countries.

The IBRD model of financing uses limited public money to leverage private financing from global capital markets, and to share burdens amongst shareholders. It is an investment bank – a point that is important when thinking about its future roles and focus. IBRD’s capital comes from its 189-member countries, who own shares based on economic size (the U.S. is the largest shareholder with 16.2 percent of shares). But only a small percentage of the capital is actually paid into the World Bank; the rest is held on country books. Since 1944, the U.S. has subscribed to $38.5 billion of shares, of which only $2.4 billion has been paid in. Together with the paid-in capital from other member countries, a total of $252.8 billion, IBRD has leveraged over $600 billion in loans.  In short, a small investment by the U.S., spread out over 74 years, has increased capital flows to the developing world 14-fold. Compared to direct on-budget support, which is the model of public aid agencies, this is a significant return for limited investment – and an effective use of scarce public resources.

What are the criticisms of the current World Bank model? Critics have argued that many of the middle-income countries that IBRD lends to have access to capital markets. Their World Bank loans are subsidized and this should not be the case. Others have argued that the World Bank should cease lending to middle-income countries and focus only on IDA-eligible countries, in particular in Africa and in fragile states. There are arguments about overlaps with other regional development banks such as the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and InterAmerican Development Bank, and that these institutions should take the lead instead.  Finally, some call for a complete transformation of the World Bank into an institution financing only global public goods.

The first critique is that the World Bank has provided subsidized loans to middle-income countries that can easily raise money in global capital markets. While World Bank loan rates for IBRD’s loans have often (but not always) been less than commercial loan rates on a country by country basis, one factor in setting interest rates has been the Bank’s ability to use its AAA rating and prudent debt to capital management to tap global capital markets on behalf of member countries which would not receive such favorable terms. In short, it spreads the risk.  Moreover, the World Bank recoups its costs on loans through its spreads, which are adjusted to reflect market and other factors. Loan charges are based on LIBOR plus a spread (which has varied over time). With this spread, the World Bank earns a modest profit after covering its administrative costs (which remain half of those of private investment banks).

Research looking at subsidies within the IBRD financing model[1] has shown that in fact, it is the middle income IBRD borrowers who have provided net subsidies to the World Bank, as funds from money made on IBRD loans generate profits which have been used to build  reserves, contribute to IDA, and modestly fund some global goods (agricultural research has been a significant beneficiary). Annual contributions to IDA from both IBRD and IFC profits have increased resources available for the poorest countries beyond the amounts the higher income countries would otherwise have contributed.

The second critique is that the World Bank should cease lending to middle income countries and focus only on IDA-eligible countries, and in particular Africa and fragile states.  Shifting IBRD lending to these types of economies ignores the nature of the financing model – and the benefits it offers all members of the institution. IBRD would be unlikely to retain its AAA credit rating and its ability to tap global capital markets at favorable rates if its pool of borrowers were the most economically stressed and lowest income countries. Indeed, the World Bank would doubtless have to rely even further on member country contributions, as IDA’s financing model is more akin to that of a public-sector development agency, with replenishments from contributing governments every three years. IDA provides a combination of grants and very low interest loans (which are heavily subsidized).

Recognizing the limitations of relying on donor contributions in an age of constrained government budgets, the World Bank has introduced elements of the IBRD model to raise more funds for IDA. In IDA18, the current replenishment, the World Bank will leverage IDA’s capital (in this case, IDA’s reflows): IDA has obtained a AAA credit rating and will supplement pledges from governments with borrowing on capital markets, raising about a third of new funds in this way.

Why should IBRD continue to lend to the middle-income countries? First, most poor people live not in the poorest and most fragile countries, but in middle-income countries. Some 2 billion people, living on less than two dollars a day, live in middle-income countries, which account for nearly 80 percent of the world’s poor. These poor people are concentrated in India, China, Nigeria, Pakistan and Indonesia – all lower or middle middle-income countries. Reaching these poor populations will require engaging in middle-income countries.

Second, the World Bank can be an effective financing partner to middle-income countries, helping to leverage a mix of financial flows to underwrite development. While it is true that many middle-income countries have increased access to world capital markets and foreign director investments, fund flows have been uneven in quantity and quality. Relying on global capital markets requires effective domestic monetary and financial sector policy management, as well as a level of domestic financial sector development. The good news is that in the last two decades, many middle-income have improved macroeconomic policy management in these areas. There is more to be done, and the World Bank has provided assistance for financial sector development and policy. Increased openness to global markets has risks, as was most recently underlined in the 2008/09 crisis which left many middle-income countries without credit lines and experiencing capital outflows. In this case, the World Bank Group was an effective countercyclical lender, providing financing for critical social and poverty programs providing a safety net.

Middle income countries will need to do more to generate domestic resources to help fund development programs, although realistically, lower middle-income countries have lower incomes and more limited revenue raising potential. The World Bank has provided assistance and financing to improve domestic resource mobilization, addressing budgeting and taxation in a range of lower middle-income countries.

In recent years, direct private investment has increased in developing countries, especially in high return projects: toll roads, airports, telecommunications. However, the private sector rarely invests in rural infrastructure or, outside of major cities, water, sewers, and transport. As is the case in most high-income countries, including the U.S., the public sector bears the burden of investments here. The World Bank has sought to “crowd in” the private sector in these projects. Through its investments, it has ensured good governance and environmental and social sustainability, encouraging private investors to buy in.

Third, the ranks of middle-income countries are increasing. Between 2001 and 2018, the number of countries classified was halved, as 33 countries moved into middle-income status (defined as per capita GNI between $1,005 and $12,235 in 2018). Only 31 countries are now classified as low income. IDA provides support to a total of 75 countries, which includes not only the lowest income but many small island economies which are not IBRD creditworthy (59 countries receive IDA-only lending), plus another 16 countries which receive a blend of IDA and IBRD resources (Nigeria and Pakistan for example). As countries graduate from IDA, their access to capital markets may remain limited due to lower incomes, and they will continue to face challenges of generating resources for development.

Fourth, the World Bank brings not only financing, but knowledge and technical assistance through its project lending. The World Bank does rigorous monitoring and evaluation of all projects that it funds, and shares results, providing one of the largest databases of development experience in the world. Project-specific data and results in turn contribute to the broad expanse of research done at the country and global level on a wide range of development issues. For middle-income countries, this knowledge is an important factor in seeking financing from the World Bank. In middle-income countries, the World Bank tends to finance more complex projects or it helps launch and spread new approaches (for example, conditional cash transfer programs which originated in Brazil as a safety net, and now have spread to Africa and other regions). In turn, experience from the middle-income countries is important to other countries, including low-income countries, in understanding what works in development. The World Bank partners with the private sector, especially on large infrastructure projects, providing its expertise in implementation, financing packages, governance, and social and environmental safeguards. It thus helps “crowd in” private investment.

Discussion remains on a suitable graduation policy for middle-income countries. Using an income cut-off poses some difficulties: as noted above, there are several small island countries in the Caribbean and Pacific which remain eligible for IDA under the “small states’ exception” due to their economic size. Other countries which are classified as “upper middle-income” have large numbers of poor people (Indonesia, China).

What about the critique of “overlap” between the World Bank and the other regional MDBs? Given the need for development capital, with the sustainable development goals requiring an estimated $1.4 trillion per year, there are more than enough projects and research that require funding – capital is scarce, and the World Bank and regional banks do not compete for investment opportunities. But one of the major differences between the World Bank and the regional MDBs lie in their focus: the World Bank is a global institution, leveraging knowledge and financing from throughout the world, and similarly spreading its lending risk amongst more countries. The regional MDBs are by definition regionally focused. This is important in some areas – regional MDBs have been able to be more flexible on issues such as lending for regional integration. But the World Bank has been able to provide leadership and focus on issues cutting across regions – from financial crises to safety nets to global warming, as argued below. World Bank shareholders who are middle-income countries use both the World Bank and regional institutions depending on the nature of the investments.

Finally, should the World Bank finance only global public goods and move away from its traditional country-level lending? It is difficult to see how this could be done—or if it could be done. Shifting to financing only global public goods cuts off key attributes that make the World Bank successful. One of the core strengths of the World Bank is its ability link its country relationships, in-depth country knowledge and project experience, with a global platform. The World Bank, through its country-based activities, gains deep knowledge of the range of development issues.  It also brokers knowledge amongst development practitioners (for example, the Latin American network of heads of units implementing conditional cash transfer programs, set up by the World Bank). But it marries that in-depth country knowledge with its global network.

The World Bank is a global platform that brings together a range of development actors—countries, project officials, the research community, the private sector—and provides a range of services. It funds projects. It does research. It provides technical assistance. It advocates for development issues (girls’ education, anticorruption, climate change mitigation). It advocates for global public goods. It brings together different actors: public sector, private sector, civil society. The strength of the World Bank is that it is both global and local.

Where the World Bank has been successful on climate change, for example, it has done this at many levels: through broad research and advocacy at the global level, but also through country-based research that led to financing projects on the ground to reduce emissions (for example in Mexico and Brazil) and mitigate climate change impacts. Without local focus and activity at the country level, the World Bank would be more similar to a global fund.  Indeed, existing global funds (for education or for health) have partnered with the World Bank and its local projects to deliver results. Through Education for All, for example, the World Bank invested in and carried out projects that served as vehicles for more aid financing for education; similarly, the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria has relied on World Bank projects improving health systems.

As a multilateral institution, the World Bank provides a platform for countries to identify and set priorities at the global level. The evolution of focal development issues in the last twenty years—HIV/AIDs, migration, governance, climate change, to name a few—have all included World Bank research, advocacy and lending. The World Bank is a means to bring countries together around priorities—but also to get action. There are certainly other multilateral channels —the UN is a major one. But what sets the World Bank apart is its ability to get results on the ground through its lending and country relationships.

The World Bank brings other attributes. It has a strong track record of financial management, on both the borrowing and the lending ledgers. For this reason, it has been effective at managing additional funds (trust funds), including in reconstruction situations (Haiti, Indonesia). Unlike most private sector projects, World Bank investments are supervised, tracked and reported on—in a transparent way.

The U.S and other shareholders should continue supporting the World Bank. Many of the world’s most pressing issues require international cooperation and the World Bank is the premiere organization to lead these efforts. Promoting economic development, growth and the reduction of poverty helps stabilize states, reduce migration pressures—and create markets.  Disease knows no boundaries in the era of international travel, which can spread infectious disease globally in less than 24 hours. The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated the interlinkages of financial markets. Climate change is a global phenomenon, not a national one, and its effects are spread out across countries.

A strong U.S. presence has shaped the World Bank in the past and should continue to do so. The idea of setting up a bank for reconstruction and development—which emerged from Britain and the U.S.—was a way to tap American capital markets in 1944. And today the World Bank can help countries tap even larger markets. The pressure of using capital markets, rather than public budgets, forced the World Bank early on to invest in the project approach, strict monitoring, supervision and sound accounting of expenditures and outcomes. Over the years the U.S., through its role on the World Bank’s board, has pushed the institution to expand investments in health and education, improve financial accountability and reduce corruption, institute open procurement policies, put in place environmental and social safeguards, expand attention to gender issues, and promote private sector development.

Looking ahead, the World Bank needs to continue to adapt its role to the changing world, building on its strengths. Shifting to new ways of increasing IDA financing through borrowing is one example. The move to help countries boost domestic resource mobilization is another, as is the expanded role of the World Bank in leveraging private sector funds, which it has done in many instances (in large infrastructure projects). At the same time, the World Bank shareholder countries need to acknowledge the changing governance challenges. No longer is the institution a bipolar one (donors and recipients); it is a multipolar world now, and the share structure of the Bank (and the IMF) need to reflect this. The U.S. did not support a capital increase and shifting voting shares in the past, which in part led to the formation of China’s infrastructure bankthe Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)—leaving the U.S. without a seat at the table.

The World Bank continues to have much to offer—it has formidable knowledge and experience, it provides an open platform to bring countries and people together around global and development issues, and it gives value for limited investment. But there is a “pay to play” aspect. Unless the World Bank receives more capital, it risks continuing to shrink, and the space ceded to other actors and platforms where the U.S. has limited influence and impact.

[1] Willem Buiter and Steven Fries, “What should the multilateral development banks do?”  Working Paper No. 74, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, June 2002

Land Grabbing in South America: Fueling Displacement and Inequality

Mackenzie Blog Pic

Photo of a woman in rural Paraguay, as part of a series of photographs that reflect the challenges and dignity of the rural poor being displaced at the hands of an agricultural export model. By Flickr user Ministerio de Cultura de la Nación Argentina under an Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic license.

By MacKenzie Hammond

As the global population continues to rise, land and other natural resources will only grow in importance. Foreign companies have taken advantage of cheap lands and corrupt governance in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa to expand their operations. Worse yet, more than 60 percent of those crops are exported, often leading to rural displacement and food insecurity in developing countries. ‘Land grabbing,’ was first defined in the Tirana Declaration in 2011 as an acquisition of land that violates human rights, dictates unfair contracts, disregards impact on social, economic, or environmental conditions and ultimately causes rural farmers to lose their way of life. Land is packaged and sold to multinational corporations which uproot families and take land away from indigenous populations and the rural inhabitants without offering alternative options for employment.

Foreign investors, such as multinational corporations, promote their commitment to add value to the national economy of countries they invest. Although selling land to foreign investors can increase agricultural exports and contribute to overall economic growth, it does not always translate into economic inclusion for local land owners. Wealth does not trickle down from multi-national corporations to benefit local impoverished populations because increased mechanization reduces labor costs and agricultural employment opportunities. Throughout history, land ownership has been a key determinant of power and wealth. Today, land ownership continues to favor wealthy stakeholders and frequently disadvantages low-income communities. This article analyzes the impact of land acquisition in rural communities of South America and, specifically, the current initiatives in place to improve the livelihoods of impacted populations in Paraguay.

El Gran Chaco is a region in South America that extends across Paraguay, Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil. The basin has been a focus of foreign investments in the last few decades because of low land and production costs, loose environmental regulations, and high returns. Land is easily acquired in these countries by foreigner’s due to weak land governance and an unequal distribution of resources. Some unenforced policy environments have enabled opportunities for exploitation. One intention of channeling foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries is to promote integration into an increasingly globalized market. Developing countries should export common commodities like soybeans, palm oil, and beef to new markets. For example, soybean exports from Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay combined in 2016 were worth $24.3 billion and accounted for nearly 47 percent of the world’s total soybean exports.

The international demand for products, such as soybeans, and the required land-intensive processes have created extensive problems for the local populations excluded from participation in the global economy. These include increased urbanization and poverty, loss of economic opportunity, and negative environmental and health impacts. Many efforts are tackling the symptoms of the problem, but more attention should address the root cause of the problem – land ownership.

In recent years, local unrest has prompted governmental action in Brazil and Argentina to limit land grabbing. Argentina enacted a land acquisition act in 2011 which limited foreign land ownership to 1,000 hectares. Additionally, Argentina and Brazil have a tax on soybean exports, which puts a burden on producers, but supports the local economy. Argentina recently increased this tax to 50 percent, which has the potential to drive out producers. Through these actions, governments are taking a stance against foreign abuse on the resources and people of these countries.

While countries such as Brazil and Argentina are taking intentional actions to alleviate the issue, others are not taking the effective steps to protect the local populations or land. Paraguay, for example, lacks thorough restrictions on foreign investments for commodities like soybeans and struggles to properly enforce current laws that protect rural populations.

Case Study: Paraguay and the Soybean Monocrop

Paraguay has one of the most unequal land distributions in the world. Nearly 80 percent of agricultural land is held by only 1.6 percent of landowners. Former President Alfredo Stroessner sold or gave away 25 percent of Paraguay’s fertile land during his 35-year dictatorship. Over the years, wealthy land owners have sold their land to large private investors. Companies like Louis Dreyfus or Monsanto are among the many investors who purchase land in Paraguay because of its low valuations, tax incentives, and comparatively good agroecological potential. Since the 1990s, most of these investments have contributed to the expansion of soybean plantations. 75 percent of all arable land in Paraguay is dedicated to soybean plantations. Of these plantations, over 96 percent of soybeans cultivated in Paraguay are exported, primarily to Russia, the European Union (EU), and Turkey, where it is then used primarily for animal feed.

The versatility of soybeans makes it an attractive crop to produce, yet sharing the benefits of this industry has remained a challenge for Paraguay. Rural inhabitants who are uprooted from their land do not benefit from soy exports because soybean plantations increasingly use mechanized processes instead of physical labor. Rural populations not only lose their land but are left without a job to support their families. The expansion of soybeans has forced nearly 9,000 Paraguayan families each year to migrate to the cities in search of work and a better livelihood.

These displaced individuals need a plan for integration into the local economy, whether they have migrated to urban settings or attempted to stay in their rural environments. For example, the World Bank developed a strategy for Paraguay that aimed to improve financial inclusion, increase access to basic services for impoverished communities, and foster market integration for smallholder farmers. The country partnership strategy will be ending in 2018, and the World Bank has not released a progress report on the impact of this strategy yet.

In addition to multilateral organizations – human rights groups, local NGOs, and campaigns are helping attract attention to this immediate concern and provoke a response from the government. Organizations such as the Global Forest Coalition and Friends of the Earth are providing land-use planning methods, legal advice and training for farmers, and human rights interventions to protect the land and freedom of rural inhabitants. Others, like the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), aim to increase rural capacity in municipalities and organizations. Local government and civil society organizations (CSOs) can strengthen and empower small farmers through facilitated dialogue between affected citizens and government, community protection programs, and cooperation agreements.

Other development organizations in Paraguay link rural farmers to markets through partnerships with the private sector. This way, smallholder farmers are reintegrated into the supply chain of agricultural exports. Despite these efforts for economic integration in Paraguay, these challenges are deeply rooted in structural and political capacity issues that will require institutional actions to improve regulatory frameworks and laws that protect land owners and help those that have already been displaced.

Conclusion

The land management crisis extends beyond Paraguay and El Chaco, beyond soybeans and indigenous populations; more international attention should be given to the situation in Paraguay and in countries around the world where land and wealth divide populations, cause conflict, and destroy livelihoods. Land grabbing will continue to increase urban density and stretch resources, housing, and jobs; youth populations will have higher aspirations than what those jobs can provide; food demand will increase as populations do and agricultural production will struggle to fulfill it. These consequences will intensify if the root of this problem is not addressed proactively. Preventing future land grabs will require an integrated stakeholder response to secure effective and sustainable resource distribution, environmental and human rights protections, and government accountability and transparency.